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ABSTRACT
Economists have long concerned themselves with environmental influences, such as neighborhood,
peers and family on individuals' beliefs and behaviors. However, the impact of children on parents'
behavior has been little studied. Parenting daughters, psychologists have shown, increases feminist
sympathies. I test the hypothesis that children, much like neighbors or peers, can influence adult
behavior. I demonstrate that the propensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights is significantly
increasing in a congress person's proportion of daughters. The result demonstrates not only the
relevance of child to parent behavioral influence, but also the importance of personal ideology in a
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By the early eighties, after nearly two terms in congress, Senator Pete W. Domenici (R-
NM) had made a name for himself. “He was a gray, pragmatic fiscal and social conservative who 
opposed abortion, gun control and same-sex marriage and supported school vouchers, tax cuts 
and mandatory three-strikes sentencing. He was no bleeding heart, no cause pleader.”
 1   
  That is until the withdrawn, indecisive and confused behavior of his daughter Clare was 
diagnosed as atypical schizophrenia. 
  Now Domenici is Congress’ leading advocate for health insurance parity for mental 
illness. He is not alone. Domenici built a multiparty coalition that has included five legislators, all 
of whose lives have been touched by mental illness. Senator Paul Wellstone’s (D-MN) older 
brother was severely mentally ill. Senator Alan Simpson’s (R-WY) niece and Senator Harry 
Reid’s (D-NV) father committed suicide. Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) has battled 
depression. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) is Patrick’s father.
2  
  While the coalition failed in passing legislation, their union did succeed in illustrating 
that a legislator’s family members may influence his legislative decision making. The idea that 
family, in particular children like Domenici’s daughter Clare, can influence parental behavior 
seems to accord with common sense. Yet, it is a concept that has been neglected by economists. 
Economists have compiled a large literature on the impacts of the environmental influences of 
neighborhood, peers, parents and siblings on behaviors from educational attainment
3 to welfare 
takeup (Bertrand et. al 2000)  to wedding a working woman (Fernandez et. al 2004).  
Yet, only recently have we begun to consider the impact that children can have on their 
parent’s behavior. Two recent papers demonstrate that child gender can affect parental decisions 
surrounding marriage, divorce and custodial arrangements (Ananat and Michaels 2005 and Dahl 
                                                 
1 Sontag, Deborah. “When Politics is Personal.” The New York Times. September 15, 2002.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Recent examples are Black et. al (2003), Dahl and Lochner (2005), Hanushek et. al (2003),  Hoxby (2000) 
Ruhm (2004) and Sacerdote (2004).    2 
and Moretti 2004). Reichman et. al. (2003) identify a link between child health and father’s 
presence in the household. 
  This paper considers whether children can influence parental behavior outside of the 
household, in the way that we believe neighbors and peers continue to exert influence over an 
individual’s behavior even when the individual is not in the presence of the neighbor or the peer. 
Psychologists have demonstrated a link between offspring gender and parental beliefs on not only 
parenting issues (Brody and Steelman 1985; Downey, Jackson and Powell 1994) but also on 
issues of political significance. Warner (1991) examines the impact of daughters on parental 
attitudes toward women, in Detroit and Toronto.  She finds that women with girls in both 
countries and men with girls in Canada are significantly more likely to hold feminist views. 
Warner and Steel (1999) find that US fathers are significantly more likely to support pay equity, 
comparable worth, affirmative action in regards to gender in employment and Title IX policies if 
they parent only daughters.   
  The shift in fathers’ attitudes is particularly interesting given the “gender gap” in political 
beliefs in this country: a larger fraction of women than men favor the Democratic Party (Edlund 
and Pande 2002).
4 Women are slightly more likely to believe abortion should be legally available. 
(Forty-four percent of women and forty-two percent of men agree with that statement.) Outside of 
reproductive rights, we see even larger differences between the views of the sexes. Women are 
four percentage points more likely to favor more crime spending (61% vs 57%), five percentage 
points less likely to favor increased defense spending (20% vs 25%), ten percentage points more 
likely to support laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination (68% vs 58%) and eleven 
                                                 
4 This gender gap has been increasing since the late 1960’s. Before this time women voted more 
conservatively than men. (Edlund and Pande 2002).   3 
percentage points more likely to believe that there should be more government services (41% vs 
30%).
5  
I take the evidence of attitudinal shift concerning women’s issues to the political arena to 
ask whether parenting daughters increases a congress person’s propensity to vote liberally on 
women’s issues bills.  The answer is yes. Using congressional voting record scores compiled by 
the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), 
I find that proportion female children is a positive and significant predictor of voting on women’s 
issues. In fact child gender explains one half the amount of variation in voting on women’s issues 
as own gender. By turning to the universe of votes recorded in the 105
th congress, I demonstrate 
that the realm of influence of daughters is most prevalent on a women’s issue on which gender 
differences are small: reproductive rights. The concentration of the daughter effect to the 
reproductive rights arena is not surprising given that past research has demonstrated a link 
between parenting daughters and liberal beliefs on women’s issues. Reproductive rights is an 
issue that is thought of as uniquely female; for those voting on reproductive rights the females in 
their lives would be particularly salient. A second reason for the pattern of the daughter effect is 
that reproductive rights is a moral issue. Ansolabehere et. al (2001) and Snyder and Groseclose 
(2000) have found that legislators are subject to less party pressure and are therefore more free to 
vote their own views on moral issues.  
Because the context of this study is congress, this work speaks not only to the 
environmental effects literature, but also to the literature that seeks to understand whether the 
ideology of a legislator factors into legislative decision making.  Personal preference or ideology 
has been shown to be a factor in a congressperson’s voting decisions. (See for example Levitt 
1996; Snyder and Groseclose 2000 and Ansolabehere et. al 2001). But what shapes ideology? 
Race and gender are two components. Pande (2003) exploits the reservation of village leadership 
                                                 
5 Author’s calculations using the 1992-2000 National Election Studies. T-tests show that the gender 
differences on views on crime, defense, protection of homosexuals and public services are significant at the 
1% level. Gender differences on abortion are significant the 10% level.   4 
positions in India for members of particular tribes and castes, to demonstrate that leaders increase 
transfers to members of their own ethnic group. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) employ an 
analogous design in the same country to show that women leaders invest more in water, fuel and 
roads (which are needs of rural women) than their male counterparts.  
While the correlation between daughters and legislative voting speaks to the 
environmental influence of children on parents, the conditional correlation does not demonstrate 
the relevance of ideology for a politician’s behavior. Perhaps constituents with liberal views on 
female issues choose legislators with more female children, believing that these individuals can 
better represent their interests. However, this does not appear to be the case. I demonstrate that 
the association between daughters and women’s issue voting is not explained away by controls 
for constituency desires. Not only do these findings provide additional evidence that a congress 
person’s personal ideology or identity matters in legislative voting, but they further uncover a 
component of that ideology: children. 
This work will remain silent on how children are able to shape their parent’s voting 
behavior. While the study is motivated by psychological research which suggests an attitudinal 
shift arises from parenting daughters, alternative explanations are possible. For example, 
parenting daughters may increase the cost of voting conservatively on reproductive rights 
legislation. The increase cost could stem from the embarrassment of a visibly pregnant daughter 
(due to lesser access to abortion) or the monetary hardship of an unwanted grandchild.
6 
Separating a “true” preference shift from a cost based change in voting patterns is beyond the 
scope of this study. And in fact, the distinction does not seem particularly meaningful given the 
evidence of the applicability of cognitive dissonance to the political arena, where it has been 
shown that the act of voting influences political beliefs (Mullainathan and Washington 2005).  
                                                 
6 The cost story would have to be combined with some cost for inconsistency (either dissonance or lower 
probability of reelection) to explain the significant proportion daughter coefficient on votes which concern 
abortion overseas and in federal prisons.   5 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II I summarize the data and 
methods. I present results demonstrating the impact of child gender on legislator parents’ voting 
behavior in Section III. Section IV provides evidence on the importance of ideology in shaping a 
representative’s voting behavior. Section V concludes.  
II Data and Methodology 
 
  The data source for this analysis is a cross section of representative and district 
characteristics from the 105
th United States Congress (1997-1998). While there are 435 
representatives in total, this study focuses on the 374 who have at least one child.
7 I am limited to 
a cross sectional analysis because of the infrequency with which representatives augment their 
family size.
8 The mean representative is 52 years of age at the beginning of the 105
th congress. 
For the most part, these men and women have completed their reproductive lives before they 
enter Congress. Of the individuals who served in the House between 1991 and 2004, only nine 
percent saw some change to their number of children during the 14 year time period.
9  
My primary dependent variable is the legislator voting score produced by the National 
Organization of Women (NOW)
10, a liberal leaning interest group that concerns itself with issues 
of interest to women. The great advantage of the NOW data, available only for the 105
th congress, 
is the wide variety of topics with which the organization concerns itself. To create their scores, 
NOW chose twenty pieces of legislation that it considered critical for women. For each vote in 
accordance with the NOW position, the organization awarded 5 points to produce a score that 
ranges from 0 to 100 with a mean of 74 for Democrats and 11 for Republicans. The legislation 
                                                 
7Michael Pappas (D-NJ) is not included in this analysis because I was unable to obtain information on the 
gender of his child. 
8 Further, the infrequency with which there is turnover in the Representative/district yields even a synthetic 
panel—tracking the gender of the children of the Representative of the district over time—uninformative.  
9 Of the 867 people who served in the House in the time period, I have child data for 828 of them. As a 
result of birth, adoption or marriage (stepchildren), sixty-nine of the 828 saw an increase in their number of 
children. As a result of death or divorce (stepchildren), five saw a decrease. And one, Representative 
Deborah Pryce (R-OH) experienced child death, divorce and adoption for both an increase and a decrease 
to her family size in the time period.  
10 Available on their website www.now.org.   6 
included in the calculation encompasses a variety of issues including equality, economic security, 
women’s safety, education, lesbian rights, health and reproductive rights. (Descriptions of the 
legislation included in the NOW score are found in Appendix Table 1.) By decomposing the 
NOW score, I can begin to determine on which issues daughters impact their legislative parents’ 
voting decisions. However, the NOW votes reflect only a small fraction of the nearly 1200 votes 
recorded in congress that session. For this reason, I perform the decomposition exercise again 
using all votes recorded in the United States House of Representatives during the 105
th congress. 
After showing that the impact of female children on legislative voting is driven primarily 
by reproductive rights legislation, I add a second dependent variable to the analysis to overcome 
two limitations of the NOW votes. Results using the voting scores composed by the National 
Right to Life Committee (NRLC)
11 demonstrate the robustness of the basic result across interest 
groups’ political leanings and across time, as NRLC scores have been calculated for the 105
th 
through 108
th congresses. The NRLC chooses ten to twenty pieces of legislation each session, 
scoring each legislator on the percentage of votes on which the legislator votes in accordance 
with the interest group’s position. The average score is 27 for Democrats and 89 for Republican 
members of the 105
th congress.
12 
Using either NOW or NRLC scores as the dependent variable, I run regressions of the 
form 
(1) Y = a + b1PROPDAUGHTERS+ b2FEMALE+ b3RACE+ b4PARTY + 
b5SERVICELENGTH + b6(SERVICELENGTH)
2 +  b7AGE + b8(AGE)
2 + 
b9-b12RELIGION  +b13(CLINTONVOTE96) +  g  + f + e 
where Y is a legislator vote rating score. PROPDAUGHTERS is the proportion of daughters that 
the individual legislator parents and g is a set of dummies representing total number of 
                                                 
11 Available on their website, www.nrlc.org. 
12 Results are also robust to the use of scores calculated by the American Association of University Women 
(www.aauw.org ) as the dependent variable.   7 
children.
13,14 As shown in Table 1, in the 105
th congress, the average legislator has 2.89 children, 
.52 of whom are female. Republicans with children, have more children (3.13) than Democrats 
(2.63). Republicans have a smaller proportion of daughters (.50) than their Democratic 
counterparts (.54). In addition, I control for various legislator characteristics that the literature 
suggests are influential in determining a politician’s behavior. As mentioned previously, race and 
gender have been shown to have a causal impact on elected official’s actions. In addition, 
legislator party, service length, age and religion
15 have been shown to be correlated with voting 
decisions. (See for example Hibbing and Marsh 1991 and Stratmann 2000.) I include the share of 
the major party presidential votes cast in favor of Clinton in 1996 and a census region fixed 
effects (f) as measures of the district’s liberalness. (Stratmann 2000 shows that as a district’s 
residents become increasingly liberal so too does the voting record of its representative.) Means 
for all variables used to estimate Equation 1 can be found in Table 1.
16 
  A threat to this identification strategy is that child gender may not in fact be randomly 
determined in this sample. Congress people may select the gender of their children to accord with 
their gender biases. Or constituencies with gender biases may indirectly select representatives 
based on child gender because of this measures’ correlation with other characteristics. I discuss 
each threat in turn.  
                                                 
13 The names of legislators’ children are published in the Congressional Directory. In cases where the 
names of the children were ambiguous (with regard to gender) or omitted I consulted Internet resources, 
phoned the member’s office (if s/he were still in office) or phoned a newspaper in the member’s district.  
14 Conditional on total number of children, the proportion of female and proportion of male children are 
linearly dependent. Therefore one can interpret the results as either the effect of a having a larger share of 
girls or of having a smaller share of boys in the family. I refer to a daughter effect throughout the paper 
because that feels most natural in the discussion of women’s issues.  
15 Party, service length and age can all be found in the Congressional Directory. Religious data come from 
three sources: the Congressional Directory, the Almanac of American Politics and the following website: 
http://www.adherents.com/adh_congress.html.   
16 Results are robust to the inclusion of marital status dummies. However, I do not include these controls in 
my basic specification for three reasons: 1) There is no theoretical foundation from the psychological 
literature for such an inclusion. 2) Endogeneity of the marital decision would result in a biased coefficient. 
(State laws seem particularly problematic as instruments when dealing with the population who creates 
laws.) 3) There is little variation. Of the 423 members of the 105
th congress for whom I was able to identify 
marital status, 90% were married.   8 
Perhaps the same congressperson, whose preferences run counter to the NOW agenda, 
prefers male children over female children.
17 The identification assumption would be invalid if 
such an individual took actions that either increased the probability that any particular child were 
male or increased the proportion of sons amongst his children. The possibility of increasing the 
probability that any individual child is male is basically non-existent for this population. With a 
mean age of 52 in 1998, these congress people did not have access to technology for fetal sex 
selection at the time of the gestation of their children. And there are no natural methods of 
intercourse timing that have a significant impact on child sex (Wilcox et. al 1995). While 
adoptive and step parents may have more flexibility in choosing child gender, both types of 
parenting are likely to be rare in this sample.
18 
 While there are no natural methods that will alter the probability that any one child is a 
boy, a couple with male preferences could follow a natural method to ensure a certain number of 
sons. For example, a couple could follow a stopping rule in which they continue having children 
until a son is born. While such a stopping rule can never alter the proportion of female children in 
the overall population, it will have within family consequences for the ratio of daughters to sons. 
As laid out in Clark (2000) parents with male preferences will have a higher proportion of sons in 
small families and a smaller proportion of sons in large families. For this reason I fully saturate 
the model in number of children. 
A congress person with male preferences is more likely to take a less extreme measure. 
He could distance himself from his female children, mentally or even physically as suggested by 
recent work documenting the correlation between marital dissolution and female children (Ananat 
                                                 
17 For instance, Dahl and Moretti (2004) find that those who view themselves as liberal are 15 percentage 
points more likely than self-described conservatives to report a preference for daughters over sons.  
18 In 1970—the year in which the number of adoptions peaked in the United States in the second half of the 
twentieth century—175,000 adoptions occurred, compared to 3.7 million births.  
(http://statistics.adoption.com/information/adoption-statistics-numbers-trends.html and  Vital Statistics of 
the United States, 1998, Volume I, Natality available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/statab/unpubd/natality/natab98.htm.) Step parenting is also likely to be 
rare in this population because of the low rate of divorce. Less than 4% of the sample is currently divorced. 
Nationwide in 2000, 15% of 45 to 54 year olds were currently divorced. 
(http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/p20-537/2000/tabA1.pdf)   9 
and Michaels 2005 and Dahl and Moretti 2004). Such behavior would merely bias my findings 
toward zero as a portion of the “treated” sample is not actually receiving the treatment.  
More dangerous to identification, would be if the congress person with male preferences 
denied his female children.  In other words, he could fail to list some or all of his daughters in the 
Congressional Directory—my most relied upon source for identifying congress people’s 
children—which would lead to a bias toward a positive association between daughters and voting 
on women’s issues. While this might be a concern in a telephone survey of divorced males in the 
American population at large, it is unlikely to be a threat in this sample. Members of congress are 
public figures. The Congressional Directory is a public document. The omission of a child in this 
document could easily be uncovered and would likely be punished by the press and then the 
voting public. In fact, a Google search turned up a website that “outed” divorced Republicans. 
About Bob Dole, the site noted that the former Senator had “divorced the mother of his child.”
19 
Thus it seems that it is unlikely that the legislators themselves are practicing some type of 
child sex selection. The issue of whether the constituents are selecting representatives in a manner 
correlated with child gender is addressed in Appendix Table 2. The table demonstrates that of the 
six district demographic characteristics (presidential voting, income, race, gender, education and 
religion) and five state opinion measures (abortion, gender equality, crime spending, social 
services spending and protection of homosexuals) only one, federal crime spending, significantly 
predicts the proportion of female children of the district representative. The coefficient on federal 
crime spending is negative suggesting that those who desire more crime spending (an opinion 
expressed more by women than men) select Representatives with fewer female children which 
would only bias the analysis against finding a child gender effect on voting on women’s issues. 
There still remains the possibility of selection on unobserved variables. However, this seems 
unlikely given that for selection to bias results, it would have to be the case that candidates who 
assume a liberal stance on reproductive rights are more likely to be elected if they have more 
                                                 
19 www.dailykos.com/story/2004/3/24/181127/078   10 
daughters (or candidates with more daughters are more likely to be elected if they take a more 
liberal stance on reproductive rights) whereas candidates who assume a conservatives stance on 
reproductive rights are more likely to be elected if they more sons (or candidates with more sons 
are more likely to be elected if they take a more conservative stance on reproductive rights.) 
Thus I assume that conditional on total number of children, child gender can be thought 
of as random in the sample and run models of the form of Equation 1 to identify the impact of 
child gender on parental voting behavior.  
III Basic Results 
A legislator’s voting record score is increasing in the proportion of female children 
parented. This relationship can be seen in graphical form. Figure 1 presents the mean NOW score, 
by party and number of female children. The top half of the figure shows the relationship for 
politicians with two children. (Two is the modal number of children in the sample.) To the very 
left of the graph are pictured all legislators with two children. Those with one daughter earn an 
average NOW score that is nine points higher than those with no daughters. Those with two 
daughters have an average score that is an additional 18 points higher than those with one. 
Democrats are pictured to the right of all legislators. While their NOW scores are higher than 
average, the basic pattern still holds. The increase for one daughter over none is four points and 
for two daughters over one is ten points. Republicans, with lower NOW scores than average, 
again show a similar pattern. The average NOW score is seven points higher for one daughter 
compared with those with none. The marginal increase for the second daughter is two points. 
  Three is the second most popular number of children for this population. The bottom half 
of the figure presents the analysis for legislators with three children. Once again for legislators 
overall and for Democrats the mean NOW score increases with each additional female child. For 
Republicans the pattern is not quite as clear. The mean score is greater for those with three 
daughters over those with one daughter over those with no daughters. However, those with two   11 
daughters break the trend. This group has the lowest mean NOW score amongst Republicans with 
three children.   
  The positive relationship between proportion of daughters and NOW score holds in the 
face of the full set of controls. Table 2 presents results from regressions of the form of Equation 
1. The first column, like the top half of Figure 1, focuses on legislators with two children. For this 
sample, each daughter is associated with a significant six point increase in NOW score. For the 
sample of those with three children (column 2) each daughter is associated with a three point, but 
non-significant, increase in NOW score. The analysis is expanded to all legislators with children 
in the final two columns of the table. The coefficient of 12.84 on proportion daughters in column 
3 says that on average those legislators with all female children have NOW scores that are a 
significant 13 points higher than those with all male children. The column 3 specification 
includes no controls (other than number of children) and reflects the “pure” effect of daughters on 
voting if one believes that child gender may also affect other legislator characteristics, in 
particular choice of party. In column 4 I return to examining the impact of child gender above and 
beyond any of those observed legislator characteristics and find that legislators with all female 
children have NOW scores that are a significant six points higher than those with all male 
children. To put that number in perspective note that female legislators, on average, have a 
conditional increase in their score of 11 points over male legislators. In other words, child gender 
has about half the impact on score of one’s own gender.  
   Turning attention to subgroups of representatives, I demonstrate in columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 3 that while both male and female legislators show a significant increase in voting record 
score for an increase in proportion of daughters, only for male legislators (with over seven times 
the sample size) is the relationship significant.  (In Table 3 each cell presents the coefficient on 
the variable Proportion Daughters from a different regression.) Due to the imprecise nature of the 
female children coefficient in the female representative regression, no conclusions can be drawn 
about the impact of female children on the voting behavior of female representatives. In the   12 
remainder of the paper, I will at times refer to the influence of daughters on “congressmen” 
instead of “congress people” for this reason. 
Scores are increasing in proportion female children for both Democratic and Republican 
House members. (See columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.) While the point estimate is slightly larger for 
Democrats, the increased standard errors mean that the estimate is significant for neither party 
and that the party estimates are not significantly different from one another.  
Moving from subgroups of legislators to subgroups of legislation, I next decompose the 
NOW voting record score into its twenty component votes in order to investigate on which issue 
we see the greatest association between female children and voting patterns. The answer, shown 
in Table 4, is reproductive rights and women’s safety. In this table, each row refers to a different 
piece of legislation included in the voting record score. Legislation is grouped into seven topic 
areas: equality, reproductive rights, safety, economic security, education, lesbian rights and 
health. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the legislator voted in accordance 
with the NOW position on this piece of legislation. The key independent variable remains the 
legislator’s proportion of daughters. Agreement with the NOW position is significantly increasing 
in proportion female children on six of the twenty issues. Those six include four of the seven 
votes on reproductive rights. The four concern partial birth abortion, transporting teens across 
state lines for abortions, FDA funding to review abortion drugs and availability of contraceptives 
to federal workers. While all reproductive rights specifications produced positive proportion 
daughters coefficients, for the remaining three reproductive rights votes, the relationship was 
insignificant. The remaining two issues on which proportion female children was a significant 
predictor of agreement with the NOW position were the two opportunities to sponsor legislation 
(which never came to a vote) on domestic violence programs and federal prosecution of hate 
crimes. 
  To create its voting record score NOW selected only a tiny fraction of the nearly 1200 
votes recorded for the 105
th congress. While it is unlikely that NOW’s selection method was a   13 
function of the degree to which legislators with daughters voted in accordance with their position, 
it is possible that their method was based on a function of some other characteristic of the 
legislation. Snyder (1992) argues that interest groups choose a disproportionate number of close 
votes exaggerating the degree of extremism and bipolarity in congress. And in fact while 75% of 
votes chosen by NOW were close
20, only 45% of all votes taken in that congress were close.
21 
Such selection concerns motivate an investigation of how daughters correlate with voting across 
vote types. To this end I have taken all House roll call votes
22 for the 105
th congress, classified 
them by issue type according to Ansolabehere et. al (2001) and rerun the decomposition exercise 
with this greatly expanded sample of 873 votes.
23 
  Moving to the expanded sample, the reproductive rights channel appears roust. The same 
cannot be said for the crime channel. As Table 5 demonstrates, moral and religious issues (which 
include abortion and contraception) show the greatest number of significant proportion daughters 
coefficients.
24 For 50% percent of all moral and religious votes, the coefficient on the proportion 
daughters is significant.
25 (Fifty percent is far greater than the approximately 10% we would 
expect by chance under a true null of no impact of daughters on legislative voting.) The 42 moral 
and religious issue votes include 29 on abortion (62% significant), two on contraception (both 
significant), six on church and state issues (none significant), and five others
26 (of which only the 
one on gay adoption showed a significant correlation). On the other hand, the 12 percent of crime 
                                                 
20 Of the 16 that actually were votes as opposed to the four bills which never made it to a vote for which 
NOW awarded points for sponsorship. 
21 Lopsided (close) defined as more (less) than 65% on the winning side as in Snyder and Groseclose 
(2000). 
22 Available on Charles Stewart’s web page at http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. 
23 1187 votes were recorded across the two sessions of this congress. For 1165 of those, yes and no votes 
(as opposed to a simple quorum) were recorded. 1036 of the remainder showed variation within the votes. 
Ansolabehere et. al (2001) assigned issue types to 876 of these. I eliminated the three votes classified as 
civil rights due to the small sample.   
24 Across issues, proportion of daughters, if significantly correlated with voting behavior, correlate 
positively with more liberal voting as measured by the relative behavior of Democrats and Republicans. 
25 At the 10% level; the same pattern of results holds at a 5% significance level.  
26 On gay adoption, marijuana, teens and tobacco and suicide (2).   14 
votes for which the proportion daughter coefficient is significant is hardly greater than we would 
expect due to chance.
27  
  At 29 percent, votes on labor policy show the second highest frequency of significant 
proportion female coefficients. Executive branch regulations at 26 percent significant come in 
third. While labor is an issue on which men and women disagree,
28 the executive branch 
regulations warrant explanation. The fact is that three of the six votes that produced significant 
proportion daughters coefficients could easily have been classified as labor regulations. Two 
focus on reducing paperwork for small business, education and non-profit organizations and one 
on issues of health, human safety and the environment.
29  
The conclusion of both decomposition exercises is that while there may be some 
association between parenting female children and voting liberally on issues on which men and 
women differ significantly, such as labor and crime, the relationship between daughters and 
voting is strongest on an issue on which the sexes do not differ greatly—reproductive rights. 
Why are votes on reproductive rights particularly influenced by a legislator’s proportion 
of female children? For two reasons, I hypothesize. First, reproductive rights is generally thought 
of as precisely a women’s issue. Unlike lesbian rights which focus on a subset of the female 
population or economic security issues which focus on a group that is broader than the female 
population, the focus of reproductive rights is exactly the female population. It is likely when a 
congressperson confronts a vote on reproductive rights, he thinks that this is a vote that will 
impact females. For parents of daughters, the issue then takes on “increased salience” (Warner 
and Steel 1999).  
                                                 
27 However, only one of the 59 crime votes concerned violence against women in particular so one cannot 
conclude that proportion of female children has no impact on voting on issues of violence against women. 
This one vote showed an insignificant proportion female coefficient.  
28 As shown earlier, women are more likely than men to favor the Democratic Party and increased spending 
on health, education and welfare. 
29 The other three are on the Federal Agency compliance act, disclosing information about increased federal 
expenditures, and Clinton’s assertion of executive privilege in the Lewinsky scandal.   15 
  A second reason—unique to the congressional context—that reproductive rights voting is 
more greatly tied to daughters than other NOW issues is that reproductive rights is a moral issue. 
Ansolabehere et. al (2001) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that political parties exhibit 
less influence on congress person’s voting on moral and religious issues in this country. In 
Britain, Hibbing and Marsh (1987) show that partisan forces are much weaker on so called “free 
votes,” which “frequently deal with controversial issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, 
homosexuality, and the like”.
30 More influential on these controversial decisions are legislator 
personal characteristics such as religion, age and education. The decomposition results suggest 
that the relevant characteristics extend beyond the personal, to the environmental. 
IV Impact of a Politician’s Identity  
Because the context of this study is the United States congress the data speak not only to 
how children impact a parent’s behavior, but also to how the attitudes of a congress person affect 
representation of the constituency. An open question in political economy is to what extent the 
identity of the representative (as opposed to the constituency views) influences political behavior. 
Previous research has found that politicians favor members of their own race and gender in the 
distribution of resources (Pande 2003 and Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). The findings of 
Section III suggest that in addition to race and gender, family, in particular child gender may also 
shape a politician’s behavior. However, the difficulty of such an interpretation is the possibility of 
omitted constituency variables from Equation 1. Perhaps female children do not cause a 
representative to vote more in line with the NOW positions, but rather citizens who have such 
liberal views believe legislators with more female children better represent them. Note however 
that sixty percent of self-reported voters failed to identify even one of their district candidates for 
House of Representatives just weeks after the election.
31 It seems unlikely that voters are aware of 
the gender composition of candidate’s children. Nonetheless, there exists the potential for an 
                                                 
30 Given party and other political pressures, the attitudinal shifts caused by raising daughters may be more 
widespread than the behavioral shifts measured here. 
31 Author’s calculations using National Election Study data for the years 1992-2000.   16 
omitted explanatory variable that correlates with both legislator child gender composition and 
district opinion on women’s issues.  
Because of the cross sectional nature of the data, I provide in this section only suggestive 
evidence that child gender has a causal impact on voting on reproductive rights.
32 In addition to 
Appendix Table II which showed that non constituency characteristic apart from feelings on 
crime spending could predict the representative’s proportion of daughters, the evidence will come 
from expanding the model of Equation 1 to allow for covariates to control for constituency 
characteristics and opinions. I find that the addition of these covariates does not significantly 
change the coefficient on proportion daughters. This is true not only for the 105
th congressional 
sample combined with the NOW voting scores, but also for the 105
th to 108
th congressional 
samples combined with the NRLC voting scores.  
Table 6 shows results using the NOW voting scores. Column 1 repeats the basic 
specification from Table 2 Column 4 for comparison. In Column 2 the model is amended to 
include controls for district income, race, gender mix and education.
33 The coefficient on 
proportion daughters remains significant, changing slightly from 6.18 in column 1 to 5.87 in 
column 2. Of the district characteristics, only fraction college graduates proves to significantly 
predict legislator NOW score. Each percentage point increase in college graduates is associated 
with a significant .5 point increase in voting score.  
                                                 
32 Unfortunately three cleaner methods of controlling for constituent views proved uninformative. The first 
is to exploit the panel nature of the AAUW data and control for constituent views by means of congress 
person fixed effects. This method suffers from two liabilities: 1) It only captures the immediate (at most 
two year) impact of female children on voting. 2) There is little within person variation in number of 
children. A second strategy is to create a “synthetic” panel which relies on congressional district rather than 
congress member fixed effects. Variation comes from the change in congress people over time. 
Unfortunately, there is very little turnover and this method too proved uninformative. A third strategy is to 
move to the Senate and control for constituent characteristics using state effects. However, the correlation 
between daughters and Senate voting record is insignificant, both with and without the inclusion of state 
dummies. Further the correlation is unstable as it switches from positive to negative depending on the 
congress. It is not clear whether the lack of relationship between daughters and voting in the Senate is due 
to sample size or an underlying difference in senatorial and representative behavior.  
33 Census data by district are available from Lubin 1997.     17 
In column 3 I rely on more direct measures of constituency preferences. I add to the basic 
model variables on public opinion on the various issues included in the NOW rating score. Drawn 
from the National Election Study (NES), the additional variables are the fraction of the state 
population who believe (around the time of the election for the 105
th congress) 1) abortion should 
always be legal; 2) women and men are equal; 3) federal crime spending should be increased; 4) 
government should spend more on services
34; and 5) that there should be laws to protect 
homosexuals from discrimination.  These variables speak to the degree to which district views are 
in line with NOW views and whether a correlation between district views and legislator child 
gender composition is driving results.
35 Results in column 3 suggest that this is not the case. The 
addition of these variables serves to slightly increase the coefficient on proportion daughters. The 
relationship between NOW voting score and population views on equality, crime, spending on 
services and discrimination against gays proves insignificant. On the other hand, as the share of 
the state population who feel abortion should always be legal increases, so too does legislator 
NOW score. This is notable because as the decomposition exercise demonstrated, the relationship 
between number of female children and voting on women’s issues is driven largely by the 
reproductive rights issue. This fact suggests that if an omitted variable bias exists, the culprit 
variable is likely one on popular opinion on abortion rights. As column 3 shows, the addition of 
such a variable does not change the basic result of about a six point increase in NOW score for a 
100% increase in proportion daughters. This result is robust to the inclusion of demographic and 
opinion variables in a single regression, as shown in the final column of the table.  
Table 7 shows that the results of Table 6 are robust across years and datasets. The 
dependent variable in this table is the voting score computed by the NRLC, a conservative think 
thank that concerns itself with reproductive issues. NRLC has computed voting record scores for 
                                                 
34 The question mentioned in particular health and education. 
35 The limitation of these variables stems from the small sample sizes used in the NES which forces me to 
aggregate to state, rather than district, level in order to create reasonable cell sizes. Even at this level, I can 
only construct measures for thirty-five states. Individual observations for the remaining fifteen are limited 
or non-existent.   18 
the 105
th to 108
th congresses. Each row of the table corresponds to a different congress. The first 
column of the table reproduces the basic result from column 4 of Table 2 substituting the NRLC 
for the NOW scores. Results for the 105
th congress indicate that a 100% increase in proportion 
daughters is associated with a significant nine point increase in NRLC score (column 1, row 1). 
(The dependent variable is 100-NRLC score so that a positive coefficient still indicates voting in 
a more liberal direction.) That the point estimate on proportion daughters using the NRLC data is 
larger than that derived using the NOW data is not unexpected. NRLC focuses specifically on 
reproductive issues, precisely those issues that seem to be driving the association between 
proportion daughters and NOW score.  
The remaining cells in column one demonstrate the robustness of the basic result across 
time. For all congresses the proportion daughters coefficient is positive and economically 
significant at a magnitude of five or greater.
36 For three of the four congresses, the coefficient is 
statistically significant. 
In the remaining columns of the table, I investigate whether NRLC results are 
“explained” by constituent characteristics by comparing the proportion daughter coefficient from 
models that do and do not include the additional constituency characteristics from Table 6. The 
final column of Table 7 presents results from the expanded model. For comparison, the middle 
column of the table presents results of running the basic model on the sample for which there are 
data to run the expanded model.  
There is little evidence of omitted constituency characteristics biasing the basic model. 
For the two congresses in which column 2 results are significantly different from zero, column 3 
results are as well. For the 106
th congress, the basic model on the limited sample (column 2) is no 
longer significant. But the fact that the proportion daughters coefficient grows by less than .5 with 
the addition of the constituency characteristics suggests there is little omitted variables bias. The 
proportion daughter coefficient falls by a point from column 2 to column 3 for the 108
th 
                                                 
36 NRLC awards between 5 and 10 points per vote depending on the number of votes chosen per year.    19 
congressional sample which could be interpreted as evidence of constituents “capturing” the 
daughter effect. However, that the daughter effect is insignificant for the 108
th congress and in the 
light of the evidence from the previous congresses, that interpretation seems tenuous.  
Thus the evidence from the cross section points to daughters as increasing their legislator 
fathers’ propensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights issues. This daughter voting linkage 
does not appear to be captured by the constituency. Rather children appear to be a part of the 
“ideology” that determines legislative voting, in addition to constituency. 
VI. Conclusion 
  While the notion that a legislator’s children influence his congressional voting behavior 
appears commonsensical, there has, to this point and to my knowledge, been no evidence to 
quantitatively substantiate this intuition. This paper begins to fill this hole in the literature. I find 
that conditional on number of children, parenting an additional female child increases a 
representative’s propensity to vote liberally on women’s issues, particularly reproductive rights. 
Such a voting pattern does not seem to be explained away by constituency preferences, 
suggesting not only does parenting daughters affect preferences, but also that personal 
preferences affect legislative behavior.   
Consequently these results speak to two literatures. To the realm of environmental 
effects, such as peers and neighborhoods, this work suggests that we should add offspring effects. 
Not only should we consider the impact that parents have on children’s attitudes and behavior, 
but we should consider that there may be reverse causality in the parental/child attitude 
relationship.  
A second contribution of this work is to the literature on congressional voting. This paper 
not only provides a robustness check on the finding that ideology impacts legislative voting, it 
also serves to identify an additional component of that ideology: child gender composition.  20 
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE MEANS 








Independent Variables         
Legislator’s Children         
Number of daughters    1.48  1.4  1.55 
Number of children    2.89  2.63  3.13 
Proportion daughters    .52  .54  .5 
         
Total Number of 
Children          
Zero  .14       
One  .09  .11  .15  7 
Two  .32  .37  .40  34 
Three  .22  .25  .24  26 
Four  .13  .15  .12  18 
Five or more  .10  .12  .09  15 
         
Legislator 
Characteristics         
White  .87  .86  .74  .97 
Female  .11  .11  .16  .07 
Mean age  52  53  54  51 
Service length (years)  9  9  10  8 
         
Protestant  .60  .66  .52  .71 
Catholic  .30  .27  .34  .21 
Other Christian  .04  .04  .01  .07 
Other religion  .06  .05  .11  .01 
None  .01  .01  .02  0 
         
Clinton Vote in 1996  .50  .50  .59  .43 
         
Dependent Variables         
NOW score
3  41  41  74  11 
Right to Life score  59  60  27  89 
         
N  435  374  176  198 
1Michael Pappas (D-NJ) is not included in this analysis because I was unable to obtain information on the 
gender of his child. 
2Including Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT). 
3NOW did not calculate scores for four individuals who did not complete the entire term. For this variable, 
n=431 (column 1), n=371 (column 2), n=174 (column 3) and n=197 (column 4).   24 
TABLE 2: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT’S VOTING ON WOMEN’S ISSUES 
  Legislators with Two 
Children 
Legislators with Three 
Children 
All Legislators with 
Children 
All Legislators with 
Children 




   




         
Other Legislator Characteristics         




  11.31*** 
(2.82) 




  -45.21*** 
(2.26) 
         
Controls for race, service length, age, religion, 
region and Clinton vote share 
      Yes 
Number of children fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
N  138  93  371  371 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 3: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT’S VOTING ON WOMEN’S 
ISSUES, BY LEGISLATOR GENDER AND PARTY 
(Each cell presents the coefficient on proportion daughters from a different regression.) 
      Gender  Party 
Data Source  All Legislators    Men  Women  Democrats
1  Republicans 
Proportion daughters  6.18** 
(2.67) 








N  371    328  43  174  197 
Note: All specifications include legislator race, gender, party, service length (and its square) and age 
(and its square), number of child, religion and region dummies and percent of two party district vote 
in favor of Clinton.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
1 Including Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT).   25 
 
 
TABLE 4: DECOMPOSITION OF IMPACT OF CHILD GENDER MIX ON NOW VOTING RECORD SCORE 
(Dependent variable equals one if the legislator voted with the NOW position) 
 




   
Equality         
Equal Rights Amendment  .03  (.05)     
Pay Equity  .03  (.05)     
Reproductive Rights         
Abortion Ban  .11  (.05)**     
Teen Access to Abortion  .10  (.05)**     
Contraceptives for Federal Employees  .07  (.06)     
RU-486  .07  (.06)     
Teen Access to Contraceptives  .13  (.06)**     
International Family Planning  .09  (.06)     
Contraceptive Use  .13  (.07)*     
Women’s Safety         
Violence Against Women  .10  (.05)*     
Hate Crimes  .11  (.06)*     
Economic Security         
Affirmative Action in Federal Contracts  -.03  (.06)     
Working Families Flexibility  .07  (.05)     
Bankruptcy   -.02  (.05)     
Education         
Private and Religious Schools  .04  (.05)     
Affirmative Action in Higher Education  .08  (.06)     
Tax Free Education  .06  (.04)     
Lesbian Rights         
Discrimination in Federal Employment  .07  (.06)     
Equal Health Care Benefits  .04  (.05)     
Health         
Patient’s Rights  -.03  (.04)     
Note: All specifications include legislator race, gender, party, service length (and its square) and age (and 
its square), number of child, religion and region dummies and percent of two party district vote in favor of 
Clinton.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 5: DAUGHTER INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATIVE 
VOTING BY ISSUE TYPE  
 
Note: Data on legislative voting records is available on 
Charles Stewart’s web page at 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. Vote issue 
types follow Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) and 
were provided by the authors. Civil rights and gun control 
categories not used because of sample size. None of the bills 
the authors labeled as civil rights votes showed a significant 
coefficient on proportion daughters. The authors categorized 
no bills as gun control in the 105
th congress. Each regression 
includes Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 
presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, 
age, age squared, service length, square of service length, 
and religion, child number and region dummies 
1At the 10% level. 
2This subcategory is my own creation. 








Moral, Religious Issues  .5  42 
·  Abortion  .62  29 
·  Church and State  .00  6 
·  Contraception
2  1.00  2 
·  Other  .20  5 
     
Social Security, Medicare  .14  7 
General Budget, Taxes, Spending  .14  99 
Executive Branch Regulations  .26  23 
Crime Policy, Civil law  .12  59 
Business Regulation  .12  68 
House Rules, Elections  .08  139 
Health, Education, Welfare  .12  74 
Labor Policy  .29  31 
Agriculture, Fishing  .03  36 
Defense, Veterans   .14  76 
Public Works, Transportation  .18  51 
Foreign Aid, Trade, Immigration  .12  137 
Energy, Environment  .16  31   27 
 
TABLE 6: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT’S VOTING ON WOMEN’S 
ISSUES (EXPANDED MODEL), NOW DATA 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








         
District Characteristics         










Median income in thousands (mean=35.69)     .16 
(.19) 
  .21 
(.2) 
Fraction white (mean=.8)    -4.49 
(9.18) 
  -8.62 
(9.49) 
Fraction female (mean=.52)    -90.17 
(73.86) 
  -108.5 
(77.65) 
Fraction college graduates (mean=.2)    45.67** 
(19.23) 
  41.03** 
(20.57) 
Constituent religion variables    Ö￿   Ö￿
         
District Opinions         
Fraction of state population who believe …         








Federal crime spending should be increased 
(mean=.68) 




Government should spend more on services 
(health, education) (mean=.33) 




There should be laws to protect homosexuals 
from discrimination (mean=.66) 




         
         




Note: All specifications include legislator number of children, gender, race, party, age and its square, service 
length and its square and religion and child number dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 
5% and * at 10%. 
1Constituent religion data, from Kosmin and Mayer (2001), are not available for Alaska and Hawaii.  
2District opinion data are not available for fifteen states. Basic model without these states produces a 
coefficient on number of children of 6.34 (2.91). 
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TABLE 7: IMPACT OF FEMALE CHILDREN ON LEGISLATOR PARENT’S VOTING ON WOMEN’S ISSUES (EXPANDED 
MODEL), RIGHT TO LIFE SCORES 
(Each cell presents the coefficient on proportion daughters from a different regression.) 
 










1  [333]  [333] 









[378]  [301]  [301] 









[379]  [311]  [311] 









[378]  [312]  [312] 
Note: The dependent variable is (100-NRLC) score for comparability with NOW analysis. Basic specifications include legislator 
number of children, gender, race, party, age and its square, service length and its square and religion, child number and region 
dummies. Expanded specifications include all of the covariates in the basic model plus district income, fraction white, fraction 
female, fraction college graduates, state religion dummies and fraction of state population who believe abortion should always be 
legal, women and men equal, federal crime spending should be increased, government should spend more on social services and that 
there should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination.  The NES did not ask the crime spending nor the homosexual 
discrimination question during the time of the election for the 106
th congress; I have substituted responses from the time of the 
election of the 105
th congress. The NES did not ask any of opinion questions during the time of the election for the 108
th congress; I 
have substituted responses from the time of the election for the 107
th.   
1Sample size [in brackets] varies due to availability of opinion questions in NES.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF NOW HOUSE VOTES  
 
Description of Bill  Percent 
Voting with 
NOW 
Women’s Equality   
Equal  Rights  Amendment:  Allows  additional  time  for  three  more  states  to  ratify  ERA,  which  would  meet  constitutional 
requirement. Never voted on. (Sponsorship=+)
1 
29 
Pay Equity: Two bills never voted on. The first amends the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to prohibit discrimination (sex, race, 
national origin) in wages in comparable jobs within a workplace. The second provides additional remedies for women who are not 
paid equal wages for equal work. (Sponsorship =+) 
24 
   
Reproductive rights   
Abortion Ban: Overrides Clinton’s veto of “partial-birth” abortion ban. (N=+)  30 
Teen Access to Abortion: Makes it a federal crime to transport or accompany a minor across state lines for an abortion without 
parental notification. (N=+) 
34 
Contraceptives for Federal Employees: Requires FEHBP plans to treat five contraceptives with parity with other prescription 
drugs. (Y=+) 
51 
RU-486: Withholds funds from the FDA to review and approve drugs that induce medical abortions. (N=+)  46 
Teen Access to Contraceptives: Requires teens seeking prescription contraception at Title X clinics to have parental consent. 
(N=+) 
46 
International Family Planning: Denies  funding  for family planning and population  assistance to  foreign organizations that 
perform or promote abortions. (N=+) 
45 
Contraceptive Use: Defines certain contraceptives as abortifacients, thus prohibiting their use under FEHBP plans. (N=+)  51 
   
Safety   
Violence  Against  Women:  Addresses  problems  of  domestic  violence,  rape  and  sexual  assault  through  community  based 
programs. Never voted on. (Sponsorship=+) 
33 
Hate Crimes: Permits federal prosecution of violent bias crimes based on sex, sexual orientation and disability. Never voted on. 
(Sponsorship=+) 
31 
Note: Continued on next page.   31 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONTINUED): DESCRIPTION OF NOW HOUSE VOTES 
 
Description of Bill  Percent 
Voting 
with NOW 
Economic Security   
Affirmative Action in Federal Contracts: Repeals affirmative action programs in awarding federal transportation contracts. 
(N=+) 
18 
Working Families Flexibility: Gives employers more discretion as to when to provide comp time instead of paid overtime to 
employees. (N=+) 
49 
Bankruptcy: Treats credit card debt and child support/alimony in a similar manner when a debtor files for bankruptcy. (N=+)   27 
   
Education   
Private and Religious Schools: Provides federal monies for a voucher program. (N=+)  53 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Prohibits affirmative action for women and minorities in admission. (N=+)  57 
Education IRA: Allows individuals to use IRA’s for elementary and secondary school. (N=+)  45 
   
Lesbian Rights   
Discrimination  in  Federal  Employment:  Overturns  Clinton’s  Executive  Order  banning  discrimination  based  on  sexual 
orientation. (N=+) 
58 
Equal Health Care Benefits: Prohibits federal funds from being distributed to a locality that mandates that its contractors provide 
health care benefits to unmarked domestic partners of employees. (N=+) 
49 
   
Health   
Patient’s Rights: Provides patient protections under HMO’s. Doesn’t allow for individuals to sue health plans for personal injury 
or wrongful death or see outside specialists. (N=+) 
48 
1 Y/N/Sponsorship=+ indicates on what basis a legislator was awarded points by NOW with regards to the piece of legislation. “Y”/”N” indicates a 
vote in favor/against. In some cases in which legislation never came to the floor for a vote, NOW awarded points for bill sponsorship.   32 
APPENDIX TABLE 2: EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATOR SELECTION FOR PROPORTION GIRLS, 105
TH CONGRESS 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROPORTION DAUGHTERS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
District Characteristics       
























Constituent religion variables    Ö  Ö 
       
District Opinions       
Fraction of state population who believe …       
Abortion should always be legal      .25 
(.29) 
Women are equal to men      .82 
(.52) 
Federal crime spending should be increased      -1.53** 
(.47) 
Government should spend more on services (health, education)      -.06 
(.36) 
There should be laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination       .07 
(.29) 
N  374  372  333 
Note: All specifications include region and child number dummies. ***denotes significance at the 1% 
level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
 